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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ALBANY POLICE SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5400 
CITY OF ALBANY, 
Employer, 
- and -
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS 
UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
RICHARD P. WALSH, JR., ESQ., for Petitioner 
JENNIFER M. CONTRELL, ESQ., for Employer 
ENNIO J. CORSI, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION ON MOTION 
This interlocutory appeal comes to us on exceptions filed by the New York State 
Law Enforcement Officers Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (Council 82) 
to a ruling of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determining that a representation 
petition filed by the Albany Police Supervisors Association (Association), seeking to 
represent certain sergeants and lieutenants in the City of Albany Police Department 
(City), was accompanied by a proper Declaration of Authenticity, as required by 
) §201.4(d) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), and that the petition was timely filed, 
pursuant to §201.3 of the Rules and §208.2(b) of the Public Employees' Fair 
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\ Employment Act (Act). The Association cross-excepts, arguing that the exceptions are 
untimely, but otherwise, supports the ALJ's rulings. The City has not responded. 
FACTS 
On May 6, 2004, the Association filed a petition to represent sergeants and 
lieutenants employed by the City and currently represented by Council 82. The petition 
was accompanied by a showing of interest and a Declaration of Authenticity, signed by 
the president of the Association, Dennis Dolan, in which he stated that "I am currently 
President of the Petitioner, the Albany Police Supervisors Association (APSA), with 
authority to execute this Declaration of Authenticity on the Association's behalf." 
On January 6, 2003, the collective bargaining agreement for the term January 1, 
2002 to December 31, 2005, between the City and Council 82 was executed. 
At a conference in this matter held on June 17, 2004, all parties executed a 
consent agreement, consenting to the scheduling of an election in the petitioned-for 
unit. On June 22, 2004, the ALJ wrote to the parties, confirming the details of the 
election and addressing certain matters discussed at the conference. In that letter, the 
ALJ confirmed that the petition was timely filed and that the Declaration of Authenticity 
complied with the Rules. It is to the rulings contained in that letter that Council 82 
excepts. 
DISCUSSION 
We first address the Association's claim that the exceptions are untimely filed. 
Section 204.10 of the Rules requires that exceptions to an ALJ's decision be filed within 
fifteen working days after the party's receipt of the decision. Council 82 received the 
ALJ's ruling on June 23, 2004, and filed the exceptions on July 15, 2004. Fifteen 
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working days from June 24, 2004, excluding July 5, 2004, is July 15, 2004.1 The 
exceptions are, therefore, timely filed. 
Addressing the exceptions themselves, as we have previously held, permission 
to appeal rulings made in conjunction with the processing of a representation petition 
will not be granted absent extraordinary circumstances.2 We here decline to grant 
review of the..exceptionsi raised in Council 82'smotion. The^  issues raised are not novel3 
and will only serve to delay the processing of the petition and the holding of the election 
that has already been scheduled.4 
Accordingly, the motion is denied. 
SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August 25, 2004 
Albany, New York 
,«>*-5*' 
Michael ;R. Guevas, Chairman 
1
 General Construction Law §20 provides that the day from which any specified period 
of time is reckoned shall be excluded in making the reckoning. General Construction 
Law §24 provides that July 4 is a public holiday and, if it falls on a Sunday, the next day 
thereafter is the public holiday. 
2
 State of New York(NYSCOPBA), 31 PERB 1J3058 (1998); County of Putnam, 31 
PERB H3031 (1998); Town of Saugerties, 30 PERB P002 (1997); Town of Putnam 
Valley and Town of New Paltz, 28 PERB 1J3049 (1995). 
3
 Indeed, Council 82 executed a consent agreement, agreeing to the scheduling of an 
election. The exceptions raise issues that, if considered to be valid concerns by Council 
82, should have precluded it from signing the consent agreement. 
4
 State of New York, 11 PERB 1J3097 (1978). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CORTLAND ONONDAGA MADISON BOCES 
ORGANIZATION, NYSUT, AFT LOCAL 3829, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-24484 
ONONDAGA CORTLAND MADISON BOARD OF 
COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES, 
Respondent. 
HELEN BEALE, for Charging Party 
FERRARA, FIORENZA, LARRISON, BARRETT & REITZ, P.C. (MARC H. 
REITZ and CRAIG M. ATLAS of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the Onondaga Cortland Madison 
Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) to a decision of an Administrative 
Law Judge (ALJ) that found BOCES violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed the work year of employees in the 
title of System Consultant (Computer Assisted Instruction) (CAI) who are represented 
by the Cortland Onondaga Madison BOCES Organization, NYSUT, AFT Local 3829 
(COMBO). 
EXCEPTIONS 
BOCES excepted to the ALJ's decision on both the law and the facts. COMBO 
filed a response in support of the ALJ's decision. 
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Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we reverse the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
Our decision herein is based upon the parties' stipulated record and relies upon 
the additional documents from the stipulation relevant to the exceptions. 
In April of each year, the BOCES' component districts submit final requests for 
services. In April 2003, the Center for Learning Technology (CLT) received fewer 
requests for services than in the 2002-03 school year. The reduction in requests 
equated to 571 fewer work days available to System Consultants (CAI) employed by 
BOCES. This amounted to a reduction in funding of $261,500. 
It is undisputed that the parties' collective bargaining agreement had no provision 
for the length of the work year. Exhibit A, annexed to BOCES' answer, is a letter dated 
June 12, 2003 from Dennis Jones, Deputy Superintendent, to Deb Shumway, COMBO 
president. Jones explained to Shumway that a reduction in funding for the CLT would 
necessitate a reduction in the number of System Consultants (CAI) on staff. Jones 
proposed two objectives to achieve the necessary cost reductions and to meet the 
needs of the BOCES' component districts: 
Objective 1: Retain all CLT Systems Consultants 
Objective 2: Align the CLT consultants' work year with the districts' 
requests 
In order to achieve these objectives, Jones informed Shumway that BOCES "decided to 
reduce the work year for all employees in the System Consultant (CAI) position title 
from 12 months to 10 months effective July 1, 2003," adding that "[ajdditional per diem 
work may be available during this summer based on district requests." He indicated 
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that BOCES had notified the employees of the decision and that he was available to 
discuss the matter. 
Exhibit B, annexed to BOCES answer, is a memo dated June 16, 2003, from 
Shumway to Jones. Shumway expressed her desire to meet with Jones concerning this 
situation. She acknowledged BOCES' "right to do so," although she took exception to 
the manner in which it was done. Shumway pointed out to Jones that "[a] change in 
work year is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The BOCES did not negotiate with 
COMBO concerning this issue . . . . Unless the BOCES rescinds this unilateral 
change, COMBO will pursue the matter with PERB." 
The parties met to discuss the issue on June 18, June 23, and June 25, 2003. 
On June 19, 2003, the BOCES' Board of Education reduced the work year for the 
Systems Consultants (CAI) from 12 months to 10 months. 
DISCUSSION 
COMBO alleged, inter alia, in its improper practice charge that the "change in the 
work year was not negotiated with COMBO and was, in fact, implemented over its 
objections." BOCES contends, in its first and second exceptions to the ALJ's decision, 
that the ALJ erred when she concluded that there was no change in the nature or level 
of services and that, therefore, BOCES' reduction in the work year for the Systems 
Consultants (CAI) was a violation of the Act. 
The ALJ cited to the Board's decision in Lackawanna City School District.'* In 
Lackawanna, we held that it is a management prerogative to decide the time span 
during which work is to be performed, and the distribution of work during that time span, 
whether equally or otherwise, is a mandatory subject of negotiation. It is undisputed 
1
 13 PERB H3085 (1980). 
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that for the 2003-04 school year BOCES received fewer requests for services than it 
had for the previous school year, as evidenced in paragraph 4 of BOCES' verified 
answer. Under circumstances where there is a reduction in the demand for the 
employer's service, we have held that: 
a public employer may, for good business reasons, reduce the 
services that it provides to the public. Such a good faith reduction in 
services may justify the public employer in reducing its employees' 
workload with a commensurate reduction in salaries.2 
The ALJ recognized these principles, but, nevertheless, concluded that BOCES' 
privilege to reduce the work year was lost when the level of services was found to have 
not changed because, as the parties stipulated, BOCES employed Systems 
Consultants (CAI) during July and August. The ALJ, however, failed to support this 
conclusion with evidence from the stipulated record. COMBO stipulated that BOCES 
received fewer requests for services that translated into a reduction of 571 fewer work 
days for the Systems Consultants (CAI). This reduction amounted to a loss of $261,500 
in funding for the service. The improper practice charge alleged that BOCES hired 
some of the Systems Consultants (CAI) on a per diem basis during July and August. 
This fact was repeated in the parties' stipulation. BOCES advised COMBO in its memo 
of June 12, 2003, that "[additional per diem work may be available during this summer 
based on districts' [sic] requests." COMBO, however, failed to demonstrate that 
BOCES utilized the Systems Consultants (CAI) during July and August to the same 
extent as the past, thereby evidencing no change in the level of services. The mere fact 
that BOCES employed Systems Consultants (CAI) during those two months is no proof 
of the level of services provided. The ALJ's reliance on State of New York-Unified Court 
2
 Vestal Cent. Sch. Dist, 15 PERB 1J3005 (1982). 
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System, 28 PERB 1J3014 (1995); County of Nassau, 26 PERB 1J3082 (1993); and 
County of Broome, 22 PERB 1J3019 (1989), is misplaced. In State of New York and 
County of Broome, the employer abolished full-time positions and created part-time 
positions to complete the same work. In County of Nassau, the employer unilaterally 
increased the hours of work of nurses who regularly worked a reduced schedule. 
Thus, COMBO having the burden of proof on its improper practice charge, failed 
to produce evidence of the nature and level of service provided by Systems Consultants 
(CAI) to the BOCES districts during July and August. We cannot speculate that there 
was no change in the level of service provided nor can we accept the ALJ's conclusion 
without any factual basis. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant BOCES' first and second exceptions and 
reverse the decision of the ALJ. By our decision, we need not reach BOCES' other 
exceptions. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 25, 2004 
Albany, New York 
^l 
Michael R. Guevas, Chairman 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
r
") STATE OF NEW YORK PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SARATOGA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFFS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23829 
COUNTY OF SARATOGA and SARATOGA 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Respondent. 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
GIRVIN & FERLAZZO (JAMES E. GIRVIN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Saratoga (County) 
and the Saratoga County Sheriff (Sheriff) (hereinafter referred to as employer)1 to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that found the employer violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally issued a 
policy on July 8, 2002, that changed the time and place where a unit member of the 
Saratoga County Deputy Sheriffs Benevolent Association (Association) may make a 
personal phone call in the Saratoga County Correctional Facility (Facility). 
1
 County of Putnam, 33 PERB 1J3001 (2000) (elected Sheriff deemed joint employer with 
County). 
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EXCEPTIONS 
The employer's exceptions contend that the ALJ erred on the facts and the law. 
The Association cross-excepts on the ground that the ALJ erred by limiting the decision 
to outgoing calls when the charge addressed both incoming and outgoing personal 
calls. Both parties filed briefs in support of their respective exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ, on other grounds. 
FACTS 
We adopt the ALJ's findings of fact together with additional facts relevant to the 
exceptions filed by the parties.2 
The Association filed its charge, as amended,3 on November 2, 2002, alleging 
that the employer violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it issued a new policy on July 8, 
2002 that read, in pertinent part: 
If A Staff Member Does Need To Make A Personal Telephone 
Call, The Call Shall Be Made During The Staff Members [sic] 
Break. Personal Calls Shall Be Made From One Of The Phones 
Located In The Booking Area. Staff Shall Be Prohibited From 
Making Long Distance Personal Phone Calls, Except In 
Emergency Situations. 
The employer filed an amended answer denying, inter alia, the existence of any 
prior policy with regard to the personal use of the employer's telephones. The answer 
denied that the employer unilaterally implemented a change without negotiation 
because there was no pre-existing policy so that the July 8, 2002 "new" policy merely 
2
 37 PERB 1J4525 (2004). 
3
 The Association withdrew an allegation that the employer unilaterally limited the unit 
members' ability to accumulate compensatory time and, at the outset of the hearing, the 
Association also withdrew an allegation regarding the rescission of an overtime 
exemption in August 2002. 
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^ codified the employer's "longstanding understanding of the use of [Facility] telephones 
for personal communications." 
The amended answer also contained certain affirmative defenses that alleged 
that the employer had no duty to negotiate with the Association because it did not 
change any terms and/or conditions of employment; PERB lacked jurisdiction because 
th& Association had filed contract grievances over the subject matter of the charge, and 
Article XIV of the parties' collective bargaining agreement constituted a waiver. 
Prior to the hearing, the employer urged the conference ALJ to dismiss the 
charge because PERB lacked jurisdiction or, in the alternative, defer the jurisdictional 
determination until the conclusion of the grievance procedure. By letter dated March 
20, 2003, the conference ALJ ruled that deferral was inappropriate on both jurisdictional 
grounds and upon the merits, because the parties' grievance procedure does not 
provide for binding arbitration. This ruling was confirmed by the hearing ALJ. 
Article XIV of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, entitled "Past Practice 
Clause," continues all terms and conditions of employment previously granted to the 
employees unless specifically excluded by the agreement. The clause provides that a 
Department Head may determine that a change in terms and conditions may occur if 
the workload or efficiency of the operation is impaired. 
The collective bargaining agreement does not contain a definitions article. 
Appendix B, entitled "Grievance Procedure," contains general definitions used in 
conjunction with the procedure. Under this procedure, a "Department Head" is a person 
so designated by Charter, Local Law, Administrative Code, Rule or Resolution of the 
Board of Supervisors as the head of a department. 
) 
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At the hearing held on August 21, 2003, the Association's only witness, Donald 
Stack, testified that, for approximately 16 years prior to July 8, 2002, unit members did 
make and receive personal telephone calls during their work hours, from the telephones 
located in the towers and multi-purpose rooms in the Facility.4 On July 8, 2002, the 
employer promulgated the policy in dispute regarding the personal use of Facility 
telephones by unit members 
On cross-examination, Stack conceded that safety and security of the inmates is 
the primary concern of the department. He stated that, if the three telephones in the 
tower were used for personal calls, it would be distracting to the officer in the tower. He 
also stated that, even one person using the telephone in the tower engaged in a loud or 
long conversation, would be distracting to the tower officer. The main function of the 
tower officer is to observe the inmate housing unit below. He agreed that anything that 
would impede the effectiveness of the tower officer would impair the safety and security 
of the Facility. 
Richard Emery, the Corrections Administrator for the Facility, was called to testify 
by the employer. He testified that, prior to July 8, 2002, a practice existed whereby a 
unit member could make a personal call at any time. It was not limited to a unit 
member's coffee break or meal break. This was equally true for unit members receiving 
incoming personal calls. 
Emery explained the reason for the change in policy. In March 2002, an inmate 
died in the Facility after a fight with another inmate inside the housing unit. The New 
York State Commission of Correction investigated the incident and made certain 
recommendations about the physical conditions in the Facility as well as the level of 
4
 Transcript, p. 25. 
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supervision. The Commission found supervision lacking at the time of the inmate's 
death. 
In response to the Commission's findings, Emery stated that the employer looked 
into the reasons supervision was lacking. One of the areas that the employer looked at 
was telephone usage by unit members. Telephone records revealed calls from thirty 
seconds to an hour in duration. Shortly thereafter, Emery issued the newpolicy, 
notwithstanding that the Commission's investigation had made no mention of telephone 
usage by unit members. 
DISCUSSION 
The employer contends in its first exception that the ALJ erred in finding that it 
was undisputed that, prior to July 8, 2002, unit employees could, and did, with the 
knowledge of the employer, make personal telephone calls during work hours from the 
telephones located in the towers and multi-purpose rooms in the housing units. 
While the employer may have denied the allegation in its amended answer, 
Emery testified on cross-examination that before July 8, 2002, under the employer's "old 
system," unit employees were allowed to use Facility telephones in the tower and multi-
purpose rooms for both outgoing and incoming personal telephone calls.5 The clear 
inference to be drawn from Emery's testimony and the issuance of new policy is that the 
employer was aware of the prior practice and had consented, condoned or acquiesced 
thereto. On this point, we deny the employer's first exception. 
In order to establish a binding past practice, the charging party must first 
establish that the subject matter involves a mandatory subject of negotiations.6 The 
5
 Transcript, pp. 71-71, 92-93. 
6
 Farmingdale Union Free Sch. Dist, 7 PERB ^3056 (1974). 
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employer here contends in the third exception that the unit employees' use of the 
employer's telephones to make personal telephone calls is not a term and condition of 
employment. We disagree. While we have not previously dealt with the specific subject 
of employees' use of the employer's telephones, we have determined that an economic 
benefit can be derived from an employer freely providing something of value to an 
employee, such as the use of an employer's building as a lounge during work breaks,7 
bottled spring water,8 permitting casual office attire,9 and air conditioning.10 By 
providing these benefits, an employer affects the comfort and convenience of the 
employees' workplace, thereby adding to the employees' terms and conditions of 
employment, a mandatory subject of bargaining. This was the situation in the Facility. 
The employer established a practice of permitting unit employees to use the Facility 
telephones in the towers and multipurpose rooms for personal telephone calls. 
Employees value the ability to use the telephone for personal communications during 
the workday. Further, it has been common in our workplaces for employers to allow 
their employees to use their work-provided telephones for some degree of personal 
business. In so doing here, the employer added a benefit to the employees' terms and 
conditions of employment. Therefore, we deny the employer's third exception. 
The employer contends in the fourth exception that no past practice existed. The 
ALJ erred by merely assuming the employer's obligation to negotiate without first 
7
 Great Neck Water Pollution Control Dist, 36 PERB 1(3013, confirmed, 36 PERB1J7015 
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2003). 
8
 County of Nassau, 32 PERB 1J3034 (1999). 
9
 State of New York (Dep't of Taxation and Finance), 30 PERB 1J3028 (1997). 
10
 Scarsdale PBA, Inc., 8 PERB 1J3075 (1975). 
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," ^ employing the appropriate analysis to determine whether a past practice existed. Once 
the mandatory nature of the subject matter is established, we must test whether the 
practice alleged was unequivocal, existed substantially unchanged for a significant 
period of time prior to the alleged unilateral change and was reasonably expected by 
bargaining unit members to continue unchanged.11 The description of the practice by 
the Association's witnesses12 is corroborated by the employer's witness13 sufficiently to 
establish the practice as unequivocal. The Association's unchallenged evidence on its 
direct case that the practice existed from the time the "new" jail opened some 16 years 
ago, to the present, establishes the practice as long-standing. Emery's 
acknowledgement of the practice, without disputing the Association's evidence that the 
Sheriff was aware of the practice, is sufficient for us to conclude that the employer had 
either condoned, consented to or acquiesced in the practice. Thus, we deny the 
employer's fourth exception. 
The employer's fifth exception challenges the ALJ's determination that Article XIV 
does not constitute a waiver. We must determine whether the past practices clause of 
the parties' collective bargaining agreement conditions the grant of the practice such as 
to make its withdrawal permissible.14 Article XIV of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement leaves to the Department Head the ability to change terms and conditions 
11
 County of Nassau, 24 PERB 1J3029 (1991). 
12
 Transcript, pp. 22-23. 
13
 Transcript, pp. 71-72, 92-93. 
14
 New York City Transit Auth., 24 PERB 1J3013, motion to reconsider denied, 24 PERB 
P030(1991). 
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previously granted to employees. The employer raised Article XIV as an affirmative 
defense and, as such, it was the employer's burden to prove in the hearing.15 
At the hearing, Emery testified on direct examination that he is the corrections 
administrator for the Facility. On cross-examination, however, he could not answer 
whether he had been designated a department head by the Saratoga County Charter or 
any other local law, which is the definition of "Department Head" in the parties' 
agreement. On redirect examination, Emery testified that it was his understanding that 
the Saratoga County Legislature appointed him as Jail Administrator. It is undisputed 
that, as Jail Administrator, Emery was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the 
Facility and worked closely with the Sheriff in developing policy that affected the terms 
and conditions of the Facility's employees, as evidenced by the policy in question here. 
16
 In that capacity, he was of sufficient policy-making authority to have condoned or 
acquiesced in the subject practice that existed in the Facility prior to July 8, 2002.17 
The employer's contention that Emery is a department head for purposes of the 
collective bargaining agreement is unsupported. What is clear from the testimony is 
that Emery is the Jail Administrator, but what is unclear are his duties and whether he is 
a department head within the context of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. 
While we may not assume that Emery had the authority to represent the collective 
15
 Middle Country Cent. Sch. Dist, 23 PERB 1J3045 (1990). 
16
 Transcript, pp. 78, 96. 
17
 County of Nassau, 37 PERB 1J3014 (2004) (petition for review pending); Sherburne-
Earlville Cent. Sch. Dist, 36 PERB 1J3011 (2003). 
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bargaining interests of the employer,18 under the Act and our decisions,19 the Sheriff 
with the County is the joint public employer and the Sheriff is the department head of 
the Sheriff's Department. Emery testified that the decision to issue the policy and 
procedures manual was made in concert with and with the approval of Sheriff Bowen.20 
In fact, the policy and procedure indicates that it was issued under the authority of 
Sheriff Bowen.21 Inasmuch as the Sheriff effectively issued the policy and procedure, 
the remaining question turns on whether the procedure constitutes a sufficiently clear 
waiver. 
We have held that even a broad management rights clause can constitute an 
explicit and unambiguous waiver of the right to bargain.22 The past practice clause in 
question here, while similarly broad, is also unambiguous and sufficiently clear to 
constitute a valid reservation of rights to the employer to change a past practice without 
negotiations where "it is determined by the Department Head that the workload or the 
efficiency of the operation is impaired thereby." 
However, in the final analysis, the employer's claim fails because the proof does 
not show that a determination was made by either Emery or the Sheriff that the 
workload or the efficiency of the operation was impaired by permitting unit employees 
use of tower and multipurpose room telephones for personal telephone calls in the 
^County of Nassau, supra, note 16. 
19
 Supra, note 1. 
20
 Transcript, pp. 78, 96. 
21
 Joint Exhibit No. 1. 
22
 Deer Park Union Free Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1J3038 (1995), Garden City Union Free 
Sch. Dist, 27 PERB 1J3029 (1994), County of Livingston, 26 PERB 1J3074 (1993), Town 
of Greece, 26 PERB 1J3032 (1993), Sachem Cent. Sch. Dist, 21 PERB 1J3021 (1988). 
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manner described notwithstanding Emery's conclusory and self-serving statement.23 
Therefore, we deny the employer's fifth exception. 
The employer argues in its sixth, and last, exception that the ALJ erred by failing 
to find that the policy of July 8, 2002, was in furtherance of its mission. The employer 
contends that the ALJ erred in not properly analyzing and balancing the employer's 
concerns for safety and security and the..convenienceofthe...employees. TheLALJ, in 
effect, focused only on the impact of the policy on the unit members. We disagree. 
Here, the ALJ found no record evidence that telephone use by unit members was 
related to the inmate's death or the Commission's staffing determination. We agree. 
This was the pretext for the July 8, 2002 policy. However, we find no factual support for 
the employer's complaint that, as the result of the inmate's death and Commission's 
report, the safety and security of the Facility had been compromised by unit members' 
personal use of Facility telephones when Emery admitted the existence of an 
established practice. Furthermore, the record evidence failed to produce any finding of 
the Commission that supervision was lacking because of unit members' use of Facility 
telephones. The new policy added a further component which made its implementation 
a mandatory subject of negotiation. The new policy of July 8, 2002, prohibited unit 
members "from making long distance personal phone calls, except in emergency 
situations." The violation of such a rule would be grounds for discipline.24 Under the 
circumstances, the new policy has more than a minimal impact upon the rights of the 
23
 Transcript, pp. 71-72. 
24
 See Appendix B of Joint Exhibit 2 where a grievance is defined as any claimed 
violation, misinterpretation or inequitable application of the employment contract, 
existing laws, rules, procedures, regulations, administrative orders or work rules of the 
County of Saratoga or a Department Head thereof. 
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unit members and their terms and conditions of employment.25 Therefore, we deny the 
sixth exception. 
The Association cross-excepts to the ALJ's finding that the charge was limited to 
outgoing calls. The Association contends that the charge and the record address both 
incoming and outgoing personal telephone calls. The Association's cross-exceptions 
with regard to incoming telephone calls is in the nature of a motion to conform the 
pleadings to the proof.26 However, our prior decisions hold that the Board may not 
consider allegations that are not raised in the charge or in timely amendments thereto.27 
We, therefore, dismiss the Association's cross-exceptions. 
In light of our decision, we need not reach the employer's second exception that 
the policy promulgated July 8, 2002, was the result of the Commission's 
recommendation. Since we have found that the Sheriff was not privileged to unilaterally 
change a mandatory term and condition without negotiations with the Association, the 
origin of the policy is immaterial. 
Based upon the foregoing, we deny the employer's exceptions, except the 
second exception which we do not reach, deny the Association's cross-exceptions, and 
affirm the ALJ's determination that the employer violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act. 
25
 City of Buffalo (Police Dep't), 23 PERB H3050 (1990); County of Montgomery, 18 
PERB 1J3077 (1985). 
26
 See McCarthy v. Troberg, 275 App. Div. 139 (1949) [Where a cause of action is 
imperfectly stated, or on trial, a variance is disclosed between the pleadings and the 
proof, not affecting the essential nature of the claim asserted, the court has the power to 
grant relief without turning a party out of court.]. 
27
 County of Nassau, 29 PERB H3016 (1996); Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist, 25 PERB 
1J3001 (1992); City of Buffalo, 15 PERB H3027 (1982); City of Ml Vernon, 14 PERB 
113037(1981). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County of Saratoga and the Saratoga 
County Sheriff rescind and cease enforcement and implementation of the July 8, 2002 
provision of the policy and procedures manual of the County of Saratoga and the 
Saratoga County Sheriff regarding the making of personal telephone calls by unit 
employees, reinstate the prior practice regarding the making of personal telephone calls 
by unit employees, and sign and post notice in the form attached. 
DATED: August 25, 2004 
Albany, New York 
c ^ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
) 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff 
in the unit represented by the Saratoga County Deputy Sheriffs Benevolent Association 
that the County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff will rescind and will not 
enforce or implement the July 8, 2002 provision of the policy and procedures manual of 
the County of Saratoga and the Saratoga County Sheriff regarding the making of 
personal telephone calls by unit employees, and will reinstate the prior practice 
regarding the making of personal telephone calls by unit employees. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23790 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
HINMAN STRAUB P.C. (NANCY L. BURRITT of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MAUREEN SEIDEL of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of New York (Department of 
Correctional Services-Albion Correctional Facility) (State) to a decision of an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), finding that the State violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally promulgated a change in the 
policy and procedure for the use of pre-approved sick leave by requiring two employees in 
the unit represented by the New York State Correction Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association (NYSCOPBA), which filed the instant improper practice charge, to provide 
medical documentation in support of their requests for four hours or less of sick leave. 
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s The ALJ determined that the State had violated the Act by conditioning the receipt 
of such leave on the provision of medical documentation, an alteration without negotiations 
with NYSCOPBA, of a mandatory subject of negotiations. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The State excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred on the facts and 
the law. NYSCOPBA supports the ALJls decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision1 and are repeated here only as 
necessary for disposition of the issues raised on appeal. 
Section III.C of Directive 2204 of the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), 
) 
dated December 20, 2001, permits unit employees to utilize accumulated sick leave for 
medical or dental appointments. Such use must be requested in advance of the scheduled 
appointment and, if the appointment is for greater than four hours duration, documentation 
must be provided. Section III.E of Directive 2204, entitled Medical Certification, provides 
that: 
Medical certification is not usually required until the fourth 
continuous day....When medical certification is not submitted to 
substantiate charges to sick leave, the absence will be 
considered to be unauthorized and appropriate counseling is to 
take place. In exceptional cases, a supervisor may exercise the 
right to request certification for any absence charged to sick 
leave or family sick leave regardless of duration. 
1
 37 PERB 1J4552 (2004). 
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On August 5,1993, DOCS issued to all department employees the Revised Time and 
Attendance Guidelines that provides: "Documentation will be required of all employees if 
they use more than four hours for a medical appointment." 
On Friday, August 23, 2002, Sergeant Oehlbeck approved the request of two unit 
employees for the use of sick leave from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on Saturday, August 24, 
2002, on the condition that they provide medical documentation upon their return to work. 
Oehlbeck had consulted with Deputy Superintendent Durfee about the requests because 
the requests were for the weekend and a limited amount of time for extra vacation or 
personal leave requests was available for that weekend. The granting of the at-issue sick 
leave requests would make less time available for more senior employees to use for 
vacation or personal leave and the two employees in question were not senior enough to 
have a vacation or personal leave request granted. Durfee approved Oehlbeck's decision 
to require the two employees to submit medical documentation. The two employees 
thereafter withdrew their requests for sick leave. 
When questioned thereafter by a NYSCOPBA shop steward about her order, 
Durfee responded that any of the supervisors could ask for documentation and referred to 
Section III.E of Directive 2204. The instant charge was then filed by NYSCOPBA. 
Durfee testified at the hearing that DOCS had never provided a definition of what 
constituted "exceptional cases" under Section III.E. Durfee also testified that she has 
previously required unit employees to submit medical documentation in support of a 
request for four hours of sick leave for a medical appointment. Evidence was 
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introduced about one employee who had been required to do so but no reasons were 
given as to why the documentation was required in that case. 
The two NYSCOPBA witnesses, Donald Premo, the associate grievance director, 
and Barry Pawlowski, a shop steward at Albion, testified that they were not aware that any 
such requirement had been previously imposed and that the statewide policy was that 
medical documentation was not required for a medical or dental appointment of four hours 
or less, unless the employee was on formal time and attendance control. 
DISCUSSION 
In State of New York (Department of Correctional Services-Downstate Correctional 
Facility),2 we decided a similar issue. There, the State instituted a policy that all requests 
by unit employees at its Downstate Correctional Facility for time off to attend any 
scheduled appointment with a health care provider had to be accompanied by the name 
and office phone number of the health care provider and the time of the appointment or an 
appointment card that included the same information. Prior to the implementation of that 
directive, documentation was only required for medical or dental appointments in excess of 
four hours. Finding that the State had violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act, we held that: 
It is well settled that sick leave is a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. It is likewise well established that the procedures 
and policies for granting or terminating sick leave are 
mandatory. The new requirements for documentation instituted 
by the State affect both sick leave and sick leave procedures 
and are, therefore, mandatory subjects of negotiation.3 
2
 31 PERB H3065(1998). 
3
 Id. at 3144 (footnotes omitted). 
Board - U-23790 - 5 
Here, the State argues that Durfee's action was permitted under the language of 
Section III.E of Directive 2204, which allows for medical certification in exceptional cases.4 
However, the State has offered no definition of what constitutes "exceptional cases." The 
State can point to only one instance at Albion where medical documentation was required 
for a unit employee to utilize sick leave for a medical appointment of less than four hours 
duration and offered no...rationale as to why the documentation was required in that case. 
That one instance is insufficient to establish that the State acted according to established 
statewide practice. As it appears that the Directive and Attendance Guidelines state the 
established practice that documentation was not required under the circumstances 
involved here, it is incumbent upon the State to provide evidence in support of its argument 
that Durfee's action was permitted.5 
NYSCOPBA alleges that Durfee's statement that any supervisor could require 
) 
documentation in support of a request for four hours or less of sick leave for a medical or 
dental appointment is a change in the established policy and procedure within DOCS, not 
that it is a change in past practice. The relevant directives and guidelines upon which 
NYSCOPBA relied are in evidence, as is testimony that Durfee's interpretation of Section 
III.E of Directive 2204 had not been communicated to NYSCOPBA before or implemented 
to NYSCOPBA's knowledge, either at Albion or on a statewide basis. 
4
 The State also argues that 4 NYCRR 21.3, which permits the appointing authority to 
"require such proof of illness as may be satisfactory to it," authorizes its decision to require 
documentation for the use of sick leave for a medical or dental appointment. We rejected 
this argument in State of New York, supra, note 2, finding that this provision does not 
privilege the State to act unilaterally with respect to a mandatory subject of negotiations. 
5
 The State attached two arbitration decisions to its brief in support of its exceptions. As 
) they were not in evidence before the ALJ, we will not consider them. 
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A For the reasons stated in the ALJ's decision, we find that Directive 2204, Section 
111. E, is inapplicable to the circumstances at issue here. We find, therefore, that Durfee's 
application of Directive 2204, Section III.E, was a change in the established policy and 
procedure for the use of sick leave for medical and dental appointments of four hours or 
less duration and was a unilateral change in a mandatory subject of negotiations in 
violation of ..§2Q9-aJ.(d) of the Act 
Based on the foregoing, the State's exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is 
affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the State cease and desist from requiring unit 
employees to submit medical documentation as a condition to its approval of the use of 
sick leave for medical or dental appointments of four hours or less duration and that the 
State sign and post notice in the form attached at all locations normally used by it to post 
written communications to unit employees. 
DATED: August 25, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R, Guevas, Chairman 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order"to^ffectuate"tfie"po'licles"of"tfTe" 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the State of New York (Department of Correctional Services) 
within the bargaining unit represented by the New York State Correctional Officers and Police 
Benevolent Association, Inc., that the State will not require unit employees to submit medical 
documentation as a condition to the use of sick leave for medical or dental appointments of four hours 




State of New York 
(Department of Correctional Services) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or 
covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-5395 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local #264 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Included: All regular full-time and regular part-time employees of the 
Department of Public Works. 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL #264, 
-and-
VILLAGE OF LEWISTON, 
Certification - C-5395 
Excluded: Superintendent of Public Works, Deputy Superintendent of Public 
Works, supervisory employees, temporary employees, seasonal 
employees, clerical employees, and all other employees employed 
by the Village of Lewiston. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Teamster Local #264. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: August 25, 2004 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
